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ABSTRACT
The South African Constitution of 1996 has had a significant impact on all the branches of South African law, including its succession laws. The Constitution has transformatively reshaped important aspects of South Africa's succession laws over the past twoand-a-half decades. This Article surveys the reshaping of two such
aspects critically, namely (i) the extension of spousal inheritance
under the Intestate Succession Act of 1987 and the Wills Act of 1953
as well as the extension of parental inheritance under the former
statute; and (ii) the limitation of testamentary freedom. The aforementioned developments occurred by and large at the hands of the
South African courts under the influence of constitutional and public
policy imperatives regarding equality and non-discrimination. The
Article shows that many of these developments are positive and worthy of emulation, but that a handful of the judgments in which these
developments occurred, are open to criticism.

 Senior Professor, University of the Western Cape (South Africa); B.A.,
LL.B., LL.M., LL.D., University of Stellenbosch (South Africa).
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I. INTRODUCTION
South Africa’s succession laws determine which assets pass by
inheritance to a deceased person’s successors (or beneficiaries).1
Succession in South Africa occurs principally in accordance with
the deceased’s valid will or, in the absence of a valid will, through
intestate succession.2 The Wills Act3 regulates aspects of the former,
whilst the latter is by and large governed by the Intestate Succession
Act.4 The South African law of testate succession is a mixture of
Roman-Dutch law and English law,5 whereas the origins of its common law of intestate succession6 date back to the Schependomsrecht,
one of the intestate succession systems in operation in the Dutch
province of Holland during the sixteenth century.7 The law of succession resorts under the broader category of South African private
law.8
The South African Constitution9 and its Bill of Rights10 in particular impact all branches of South African law, including its

1. JUANITA JAMNECK & CHRISTA RAUTENBACH (eds.), THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (3rd ed., Oxford U. Press 2017); M. DE WAAL & M.
SCHOEMAN-MALAN, LAW OF SUCCESSION 1 (5th ed., Juta 2015).
2. JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 1; DE WAAL & SCHOEMANMALAN, supra note 1, at 2–3.
3. Wills Act 7 of 1953 (S. Afr.).
4. Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (S. Afr.).
5. François du Toit, Succession Law in South Africa – a Historical Perspective, in EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION – STUDIES NATIONAL, HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE 67 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh U. Press 2007).
6. South Africa also recognizes the customary laws of intestate succession
of its Black people: see JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 4–5. This
branch of intestate succession laws falls outside this Article’s scope.
7. JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 3; DE WAAL & SCHOEMANMALAN, supra note 1, at 14–15.
8. JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 3.
9. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
10. Id. at Ch. 2.
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private law and thus also its succession laws.11 It is unsurprising that
South African courts, when adjudicating on constitutional challenges to South Africa’s succession laws, have reshaped these laws
in consonance with constitutional imperatives in general and the
prescripts of the Bill of Rights in particular. This constitutional reshaping occurred regarding South Africa’s testate as well as its intestate succession laws. Two aspects of the constitutional reshaping
of South Africa’s succession laws are surveyed in this Article: (i)
the extension of inheritance in terms of the Intestate Succession Act
and Wills Act to persons not traditionally recognized as a deceased’s
surviving spouse or parent and (ii) the limitation of testamentary
freedom beyond the instances in which South African law traditionally restricted testators when disposing of their property by last will
and testament. These two aspects provide ample evidence of the
transformative effect of the Constitution regarding South Africa’s
succession laws. However, the manner in and the extent to which
South African courts have undertaken the reshaping of these laws
are not beyond reproach, and the Article also touches on criticism of
aspects of the courts’ constitutionally transformative methodologies
in this regard.
II. THE EXTENSION OF SPOUSAL AND PARENTAL
INHERITANCE
The Intestate Succession Act as well as the Wills Act provide
for the devolution of assets to a deceased person’s surviving spouse
in certain instances. The Intestate Succession Act designates the surviving spouse as a deceased’s sole intestate heir if the deceased is
not survived by descendants,12 and as a co-heir in the event that the
deceased is survived by a spouse as well as descendants.13 The Wills
11. § 2 of the Constitution states that the Constitution is South Africa’s supreme law and that all law or conduct inconsistent therewith is invalid; § 8(1) of
the Constitution determines that the Bill of Rights applies to the entirety of South
African law; § 8(2) of the Constitution renders the Bill of Rights binding on all
natural and juristic persons.
12. Intestate Succession Act, supra note 4, at § 1(1)(a).
13. Id. at § 1(1)(c).
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Act permits the accrual of testamentary benefits in favor of a testator’s surviving spouse when a descendant of that testator renounced
(rejected) those benefits.14 However, neither statute contains a definition of “spouse” or “surviving spouse” for purposes of the operation of the aforementioned provisions. The traditional meaning attributed to “spouse” or “surviving spouse” in the above contexts is
of a person to whom the deceased was married (at the time of the
deceased’s death) in a valid civil marriage solemnized in accordance
with the Marriage Act.15 Writing in 1983 (during the pre-constitutional era), Erasmus et al note the following distinguishing features
of such a valid civil marriage:
-

a civil marriage is a voluntary, life-long union of one
man and one woman;
persons of the same sex cannot enter into a civil marriage;
a civil marriage is a monogamous union; and
a civil marriage must be solemnized by a competent
marriage officer in accordance with the provisions of
the Marriage Act.16

The foregoing points to the limited meaning traditionally ascribed to “spouse” or “surviving spouse” for purposes of the directives in the Intestate Succession Act and Wills Act that appertain to
these persons. South African courts have, during the post-constitutional era, extended inheritance rights under both statutes to persons
who do not fall within the confines of this limited meaning. The
courts did so with firm reliance on constitutional rights and norms,
in particular those regarding equality and non-discrimination as well
as human dignity. A similar development occurred regarding the Intestate Succession Act’s engagement with parental inheritance. The
Act designates a deceased’s parent or parents as an intestate heir or
14. Wills Act, supra note 3, at § 2C (1).
15. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (S. Afr.). See Daniels v Campbell 2003 (9)
BCLR 969 (C) 985H, 988F.
16. H. ERASMUS, C.G. VAN DER MERWE & A.H. VAN WYK, FAMILY, THINGS
AND SUCCESSION 14–17 (2d ed., Butterworths 1983).
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heirs when the deceased is not survived by a spouse or descendants.17 Parentage in this regard traditionally carries the limited
meaning of single-generational blood relationship in the case of a
biological child (i.e., the child’s biological father or mother) or, alternatively, parenthood established through a legally valid adoption
in the case of an adopted child (i.e., the child’s adoptive father or
mother).18 These points are considered the “traditional objectively
determinable criteria of who a ‘parent’ is.”19 However, a South African court departed from this traditional meaning of “parent”, for
purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, by relying on constitutional rights and norms.
The specific instances in which South African courts undertook
the broadening of the traditional spousal and parental concepts will
now be considered in greater detail.
A. Muslim and Hindu Marriages
In Daniels v Campbell,20 the Constitutional Court decided that
“spouse” for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act includes a
party to a monogamous Muslim marriage. Such a party does not
qualify in terms of the spousal concept’s abovementioned traditional
limited meaning because a marriage concluded in accordance with
Muslim rites is typically not solemnized by a marriage officer appointed in terms of the Marriage Act, and such a marriage is thus
also not registered in accordance with the Marriage Act’s prescripts.21 The Constitutional Court opined in Daniels that the limited
meaning traditionally ascribed to “spouse” is unfairly discriminatory in its intent and impact, because it exalts a particular conceptualization of marriage to which Muslim marriages do not conform.22
17. Intestate Succession Act, supra note 4, at § 1(1)(d).
18. MJ de Waal & L Mills, What it Means to be a Parent: Implications for
Family Law and the Law of Intestate Succession: Wilsnach NO v M 2021 1 All
SA 600 (GP), 2021 3 SA 568 (GP), J. S. AFR. L. 562 (2021) 562–563, 568.
19. Id. at 568.
20. 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC).
21. Id. at para. 3.
22. Id. at para. 19.
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The Court thus declared that the constitutional values of equality,
tolerance and respect for diversity justify ascribing a broad and inclusive meaning to the word “spouse” for purposes of the Intestate
Succession Act.23 In the result, the Court ruled that the term
“spouse” in the Intestate Succession Act must be interpreted to include a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage and, therefore, that
such a spouse is capable of inheriting in terms of that Act. 24 The
position of a party to a monogamous Hindu marriage is akin to that
of a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage insofar as a Hindu
marriage is typically not solemnized by a duly appointed marriage
officer and is therefore not registered under the Marriage Act.25 It
therefore came as no surprise when the erstwhile Durban and Coast
Local Division of the Supreme Court (now known as the KwaZuluNatal High Court, Durban), bound by the precedent set by the Constitutional Court in Daniels, subsequently ruled in Govender v Ragavayah that the Intestate Succession Act must be interpreted to include a party to a monogamous Hindu marriage as a spouse who can
inherit in terms of that Act.26
Another reason for the exclusion of a party to a Muslim marriage
from the spousal concept’s traditional limited meaning is the potentially polygynous nature of such a marriage. In Hassam v Jacobs,27
the Constitutional Court had to determine whether or not a surviving
spouse to a polygynous Muslim marriage can inherit in terms of the
Intestate Succession Act. The Court decided that a failure to broaden
the Intestate Succession Act’s spousal concept to include widows of
polygynous Muslim marriages will occasion material disadvantage
for such widows to which their counterparts in otherwise valid civil
marriages or monogamous Muslim marriages are not exposed;28
moreover, that the resultant discrimination against widows of
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 37.
Govender v Ragavayah 2009 (3) SA 179 (D) at para. 12 (S. Afr.).
Id. at para. 42.
2009 (5) SA 572 (CC).
Id. at para. 34.
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polygynous Muslim marriages conflicts with the constitutional principle of gender equality.29 However, the Constitutional Court in
Hassam was unable to follow an approach similar to that adopted in
Daniels and thus to interpret “spouse” for purposes of the Intestate
Succession Act to include all the parties to a polygynous Muslim
marriage. This is because the Act uses “spouse” in the singular only:
reading this word to include multiple spouses in a polygynous Muslim marriage would, in the opinion of the Court in Hassam, unduly
strain the Act’s language insofar as it would bring about a significant
departure from the commonly-understood meaning of the word
“spouse”, as it appears in the singular in the Intestate Succession
Act.30 The Court therefore utilized the so-called “reading-in remedy” to cure the Intestate Succession Act’s unconstitutionality on
point: it ordered that the Act must be read as if the words “or
spouses” appear after the word “spouse” wherever the latter word is
used in the Act.31 Hassam’s effect is therefore that the distribution
of an intestate estate must always take account of the polygynous
nature of the Muslim marriage(s) to which the deceased was a party
and that all the surviving spouses of such a marriage(s) are capable
of inheriting from the deceased’s estate in terms of the Intestate Succession Act.
The Constitutional Court echoed the above approaches to the
broadening of the spousal concept when it ruled on the Wills Act’s
provision that permits accrual in favor of a surviving spouse. In
Moosa v Minister of Justice,32 the Court held that confining the
meaning of “surviving spouse” in the Act’s accrual provision to monogamous unions violates the equality rights of the parties to a polygynous Muslim marriage.33 The Court again cured the resultant
constitutional invalidity of the accrual provision by employing the
reading-in remedy and it ordered that the accrual provision must be

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at para. 37.
Id. at para. 48.
Id. at para. 57.
2018 (5) SA 13 (CC).
Id. at para. 12.
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read as if the following words appear therein: “For the purposes of
this subsection, a ‘surviving spouse’ includes every husband and
wife of a monogamous and polygamous Muslim marriage solemnized under the religion of Islam.”34
B. Same-Sex Life Partnerships
The spousal concept’s traditional limited meaning precludes
persons of the same sex from entering into a civil marriage. In the
result, the surviving partner to a permanent same-sex life partnership
did not qualify as a spouse for purposes of the Intestate Succession
Act. In Gory v Kolver (Starke and Others Intervening),35 the Constitutional Court ruled that any differentiation regarding the intestate
succession rights of opposite-sex spouses (who can inherit on intestacy) and permanent same-sex life partners (who cannot inherit on
intestacy) amounts to unfair discrimination against the latter; moreover, that the Intestate Succession Act’s failure to include surviving
partners to permanent same-sex life partnerships within its regulatory ambit is inconsistent with the constitutional rights to equality
and human dignity.36 The Court consequently ordered that the Intestate Succession Act must be read as though the following words are
included after the word “spouse” wherever this word appears in the
Act: “[O]r partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership in
which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support.”37
Gory therefore renders a surviving partner to a permanent same-sex
life partnership a competent intestate heir in respect of the deceased
partner’s estate.

34. Id. at para. 21. Note that the court used the generic term “polygamous” in
the reading-in order, but that “polygynous” would have been preferred because a
Muslim husband is permitted to marry more than one wife whereas the converse
–polyandry– is not permitted under Islamic law.
35. 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC).
36. Id. at para. 19.
37. Id. at para. 66.
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The Gory judgment was handed down shortly before the commencement of the Civil Union Act.38 This Act enables any two competent persons to conclude a civil union, either in the form of a marriage or as a civil partnership.39 Parties of the same sex as well as
those of the opposite sex can enter into a civil union.40 The Civil
Union Act states pertinently that the word “spouse” in any law includes a civil union partner.41 Pursuant to the Civil Union Act, a
spouse for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act thus also encompasses a civil union partner, thereby rendering a surviving civil union partner a competent intestate heir of the first-dying partner. This
statutory development raised the question of whether or not the Constitutional Court’s abovementioned order in Gory endured in the aftermath of the Civil Union Act: in light of the fact that the Constitutional Court made that order in Gory at a time when the formalization of same-sex relationships was legally impermissible – which
impermissibility the Civil Union Act eradicated – can same-sex life
partners who have not formalized their relationship in terms of the
Civil Union Act still avail themselves of the protection afforded by
the Gory order? The Constitutional Court answered this question in
the affirmative in Laubscher v Duplan.42
In Laubscher, the Constitutional Court opined that same-sex
partners who formalized their relationship in terms of the Civil Union Act constitute a new category of intestate heirs for purposes of
the Intestate Succession Act; however, this new category excludes
the category of intestate heirs yielded by Gory. For purposes of intestate inheritance, the parties to a civil union are, according to
Laubscher, therefore clearly distinguishable from same-sex life partners who have not formalized their relationship in terms of the Civil
Union Act. In the result, the Court held that same-sex life partners
38. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). The Civil Union Act commenced
on November 30, 2006 and the Gory judgment was handed down a week prior to
this commencement date.
39. Id. at § 1.
40. KOS v Minister of Home Affairs 2017 (6) SA 588 (WCC) at para. 23 (S.
Afr.).
41. Civil Union Act, supra note 38, at § 13(2)(b).
42. 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC).
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(or cohabitants) who meet the requirement of mutual support laid
down in Gory continue to enjoy intestate succession rights (as per
the Gory order) until such time as the Legislature amends the Intestate Succession Act to align it with the effects of the Civil Union
Act.43 One may be forgiven for thinking that Laubscher produced
somewhat of an anomaly insofar as the decision to keep the Gory
order in effect in the Civil Union Act’s aftermath created inequality
between opposite-sex life partners who chose not to marry or enter
into a civil union (which choice negated – at least at the time when
Laubscher was decided44 – intestate inheritance on the death of the
first-dying partner) and same-sex life partners who chose not to enter into a civil union (which choice does not negate intestate inheritance on the death of the first-dying partner). Indeed, the Constitutional Court admitted as much in Laubscher45 but because this issue
was not pertinent before the Court in Laubscher, it was not called
upon to engage with the inequality conundrum.46 Instead, the Constitutional Court reasoned in Laubscher that it is best left to the Legislature to address any equality-related inconsistencies between the
Gory order’s continued operation on the one hand, and the effects of
the Civil Union Act’s operation on the other hand.47
It is instructive to note that the Constitutional Court first
acknowledged the choice principle mentioned in the previous paragraph when it handed down its judgment in Volks v Robinson.48 In
this decision, the majority of the Constitutional Court denied a surviving opposite-sex life partner’s claim for spousal maintenance on
the death of the first-dying partner. The choice principle (or argument) advanced by the majority of the Court in Volks prescribes in
broad terms that parties who can legally enter into a civil marriage
(or conclude a civil union) but chose not to do so, ought, by reason
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at para. 55.
See II. C. below.
Laubscher, supra note 42, at para. 31.
Id. at para. 52.
Id. at para. 32.
2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
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of their choice, not to receive any of the benefits (such as spousal
maintenance claims or intestate succession rights) yielded by a civil
marriage (or a civil union).49 This principle therefore precludes, at
least prima facie, intestate succession on the death of a same-sex or
opposite-sex life partner where the cohabitating partners could have
legally formalized their relationship but chose, for whatever reason,
not to do so. The choice principle is not uncontroversial in South
African jurisprudence and has elicited criticism from some academic commentators.50 It is therefore regrettable that Laubscher’s
circumstances did not require the Constitutional Court to engage
substantively with this principle. The Constitutional Court’s subsequent judgment on intestate succession between opposite-sex life
partners called for a fundamental engagement with the choice principle but as is shown next, the controversy regarding this principle
persisted even in this judgment.
C. Opposite-Sex Life Partnerships
Predictably, it was simply a matter of time before a surviving
opposite-sex life partner would challenge the Intestate Succession
Act’s constitutionality on the basis that the extension of intestate
succession rights to permanent same-sex life partners who have not
formalized their relationship (as per Gory and Laubscher), whilst
withholding those rights from similarly situated opposite-sex life
partners, occasions unfair discrimination against the latter category
of persons. Such a challenge came before the Western Cape High
Court, Cape Town in Bwanya v The Master.51 The Court held that
no constitutionally-justifiable reason exists why surviving partners
to permanent opposite-sex life partnerships are excluded from the
spousal concept for purposes of intestate inheritance under the
49. Id. at para. 92.
50. See, e.g., Anita Cooke, Choice, Heterosexual Life Partnerships, Death
and Poverty, 122 SALJ 542 (2005); Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley, Intestate
Succession and the Survivor of an Unformalised Same-Sex Conjugal Relationship: Laubscher NO v Duplan 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC), 39 OBITER 276 (2018).
51. 2021 (1) SA 138 (WCC).
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Intestate Succession Act.52 It therefore ordered that, whenever the
Intestate Succession Act’s spousal concept applied, the Act must be
read to include a partner in a permanent opposite-sex life partnership
in which the partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support.53
Some academic commentators welcomed the High Court’s decision
in Bwanya.54 The Constitutional Court55 handed down the confirmation judgment in Bwanya little over a year later.56
The Constitutional Court delivered three separate judgments in
its decision in Bwanya. Two of these judgments are pertinent to the
present discussion. The majority of the Court expressly rejected the
abovementioned choice principle enunciated in Volks. The majority
opined that Volks was wrongly decided; however, not to the extent
that it could summarily break with the precedent set by Volks. The
majority therefore identified two considerations that distinguished
Bwanya from Volks and thus permitted the majority not to follow
Volks.57 The first consideration rested on the evidence presented to
the Court in Bwanya (evidence that was not considered in Volks)
that showed that many women in opposite-sex relationships have no
real or realistic choice regarding whether or not to marry. The reasons in this regard include women’s lack of “bargaining power” in
relationships; the dependence of women and children, if there are
any, on the financial strength of the men in the relationships; and the
mistaken belief by one or both partners in a permanent life

52. Id. at para. 190.
53. Id. at para. 233.
54. See, e.g., Koshesayi Madzika, Dawn of a New Era for Permanent Life
Partners: from Volks v Robinson to Bwanya v Master of the High Court, 53 DE
JURE 393 (2020) (S. Afr.); Fatima Osman, Splitting Hairs? Bwanya v The Master
of the High Court, 138 SALJ 521 (2021).
55. Bwanya v The Master of the High Court 2022 (3) SA 250 (CC) (S. Afr.).
56. The Constitution, § 167(5) states that the Constitutional Court makes the
final decision regarding whether an Act of Parliament, among others, is unconstitutional or not: once a High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, or a court of
similar status has issued an order of constitutional invalidity of any such Act, the
Constitutional Court must, in a subsequent hearing, confirm such an order before
it has any force.
57. Bwanya, supra note 55, at para. 47.
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partnership that they are in a legally binding “common law marriage.”58 In light of these reasons, the majority dismissed the choice
principle insofar as it prohibits extending intestate succession rights
to surviving permanent opposite-sex life partners.59 The majority
emphasized, secondly, that the “choice question” posed in Volks is
in fact the wrong question for purposes of the matter before the
Court in Bwanya: the more fundamental question is whether or not
permanent life partnerships deserve constitutional and legal protection in and of themselves.60 The majority answered this question in
the affirmative, whilst acknowledging that proving the existence of
a life partnership may at times be difficult. The majority nevertheless argued that probative challenges are no bar for identifying and
extending legal recognition and protection to such a partnership.61
In light of the foregoing, the majority held that excluding surviving
permanent opposite-sex life partners from enjoying benefits under
the Intestate Succession Act amounts to constitutionally prohibited
discrimination. In the result, the majority ordered that the omission
from the Intestate Succession Act of the words “or partner in a permanent life partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” after the word “spouse” wherever this word
appears in the Act, is unconstitutional and invalid. In order to remedy this invalidity, the majority ordered that the Intestate Succession
Act must be read as though the words “or partner in a permanent life
partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties
of support” appear after the word “spouse” wherever this word appears in the Act. However, the majority suspended this order for a
period of eighteen months from the date of the judgment to enable
the South African Parliament to take legislative steps to cure the
constitutional defects identified in Bwanya.62

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at para. 62.
Id. at para. 66.
Id. at para. 68.
Id. at paras. 75–78.
Id. at para. 95.
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The first dissenting judgment in Bwanya is also instructive for
purposes of this Article.63 This judgment focused, among others, on
the marked differences between a marriage (or a civil union) and a
life partnership, in particular regarding the legal certainty yielded by
the former as opposed to the uncertainty regarding the existence (or
not) of the latter.64 It is submitted that Bwanya’s facts underscore
the first dissenting judgment’s stance in this regard. The Western
Cape High Court found quite readily that the applicant (the surviving partner) and the deceased were indeed permanent life partners
who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support.65 The facts on
which the Court based this finding were the following: the relationship between the applicant and the deceased existed from early 2014
until the deceased’s death in early 2016 – little more than two
years;66 the applicant and the deceased moved in together, but the
applicant retained a separate abode for work purposes;67 the applicant averred that she and the deceased intended to start a domestic
cleaning business together (no evidence was advanced that this anticipated venture came to fruition) as well as that the deceased assisted her in obtaining a driver’s license and that he was going to
pay for her driving lessons and also buy her a car for use in the
cleaning business.68 The applicant alleged furthermore that she and
the deceased contemplated having a child together;69 the applicant
admitted that the deceased paid all the household and other expenses
and that her contribution to the relationship occurred by way of
“love, care, emotional support and companionship”;70 and the applicant averred that the deceased asked her to marry him71 but that the
63. The second dissenting judgment in Bwanya held that Volks was not
clearly wrongly decided and thus constitutes binding legal precedent: id. at para.
197.
64. Id. at paras. 98 and 111–118.
65. Bwanya, supra note 51, at paras. 141–142.
66. Id. at paras. 5 and 25.9.
67. Id. at paras. 7–8.
68. Id. at paras. 13–14.
69. Id. at para. 16.
70. Id. at para. 19.
71. Id. at para. 23.
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preparations for the marriage were yet to be finalized pending arrangements to be made with the applicant’s family in Zimbabwe.72
The first dissenting judgment in the Constitutional Court’s decision
in Bwanya remarked that many of these actions are found, to varying
degrees, in many relationships, ranging from high school sweethearts to adult lovers, but that this does not establish the existence
of a permanent life partnership that yields rights and obligations
similar to those that attach to a marriage (or a civil union).73 Secondly, the first dissenting judgment was not convinced by the majority’s stance on the incorrectness of the choice principle: the first
dissenting judgment opined that the choice whether or not to enter
into marriage may at times be a difficult one, but it remains a real
choice and not merely an illusionary one (as the majority suggested).
The first dissenting judgment was consequently unpersuaded that
women are “helplessly trapped in some of these relationships” due
to the reasons advanced in the majority judgment to support its
stance that many women in opposite-sex relationships have no real
or realistic choice regarding whether or not to marry.74
The Constitutional Court’s judgments in Bwanya highlight the
challenges, difficulties and tensions associated with extending intestate succession rights beyond legally formalized relationships.
Given that legal certainty is a particularly potent arrow in any private lawyer’s quiver, the reasoning advanced in the first dissenting
judgment in this case is, it is submitted, indeed persuasive. This is
not to say, of course, that intestate succession rights should not be
granted to permanent opposite-sex life partners who have undertaken reciprocal duties of support. How this must occur and the extent to which it must happen are matters best left to the Legislature
rather than the courts –a fact on which both dissenting judgments in
Bwanya concurred.75 In this light, the majority of the Constitutional
Court’s temporary suspension of its orders in Bwanya to allow the
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at para. 25.8.
Bwanya, supra note 55, at para. 117.
Id. at para. 126.
Id. at paras. 149, 195.
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South African Parliament to enact appropriate legislation regarding,
among others, the intestate succession rights of permanent oppositesex life partners appears extremely prudent and sensible.
D. Parentage in Extended-Family Households
In Wilsnach v TM,76 a decision of the Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, the Court had to adjudicate on intestate succession rights in an
extended-family household where one of the deceased’s biological
parents assumed no parental role whatsoever and was effectively replaced in this role by the deceased’s grandmother. The deceased
whose estate was at issue in this case was a severely disabled person
by reason of complications at birth. A claim for the medical negligence that caused the deceased’s disabilities was settled out of court
and, when the deceased died aged five, his estate comprised the sizeable remainder of the settlement amount. The deceased’s biological
parents (the first and second respondents in the matter) survived
him77 and would have been the deceased’s sole intestate heirs in
terms of the Intestate Succession Act.78 However, these parents provided little by way of parental care during the deceased’s short life.
In fact, the deceased’s father did not care for the deceased at all and
played no role in the deceased’s life.79 The deceased and his mother
resided with the deceased’s maternal grandmother (the third respondent in the matter) and they thus formed a so-called “extendedfamily household.”80 The deceased’s grandmother was his primary
caregiver and was granted full parental rights and responsibilities
regarding his guardianship.81 This factual matrix prompted the

76. 2021 (3) SA568 (GP).
77. Id. at paras. 6–7.
78. See II. above.
79. Wilsnach, supra note 76, at para. 12.
80. Id. at par. 13. See LF and Another v TV 2020 (2) SA 546 (GJ) at para. 41
(S. Afr.) where the Court expressly included grandparents as members of a child’s
extended family.
81. Wilsnach, supra note 76, at para. 8.
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executor of the deceased’s estate to request a declaratory order on
exactly who the deceased’s intestate heirs were.
The Court opined that the declaratory order called for a determination of the meaning of the word “parent” for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act. The Court noted that the Act contains no
definition in this regard and therefore proffered that the matter
turned on the word’s proper interpretation.82 It then looked at the
broad meaning ascribed to “parent” for purposes of the Children’s
Act83 and concluded that the word should be interpreted widely, also
for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, to include someone
who, although not a biological parent, fulfilled parental duties and
functions, and thus essentially played the role of a parent, in a
child’s life.84 In light of this interpretation, the Court held that it
would “offend the entire constitutional scheme and the values it is
founded upon” if the deceased’s absent father was to be regarded as
a parent (and thus an heir) for purposes of the Intestate Succession
Act merely on the strength of his biological connectedness to the
deceased.85 The Court ruled that the deceased’s mother, despite not
providing continuous care to the deceased, could still properly be
considered the deceased’s parent for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act.86 Significantly, the Court ruled furthermore that the deceased’s grandmother, who primarily and substantially carried the
burden of caring for the deceased,87 was “entitled to be called a parent in truth, in reality and in law.”88 In the opinion of the Court, such
a conclusion is consistent with the grandmother’s relationship with
the deceased and, moreover, aligned to the objectives of both the
Children’s Act and the Constitution insofar as advancing the best
interests of the child is concerned.89 The Court thus found that the
deceased’s grandmother was his parent for purposes of the Intestate
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at paras. 35, 37, 48.
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (S. Afr.).
Wilsnach, supra note 76, at paras. 42, 58.
Id. at paras. 65–66, 68.
Id. at paras. 70, 76.
Id. at para. 77.
Id. at para. 81.
Id. at para. 76.
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Succession Act and that she and the deceased’s mother were the deceased’s sole intestate heirs.90
Wilsnachs outcome can certainly be regarded as just and equitable; however, the manner in which the Court achieved this outcome,
in particular its interpretative reliance on the Children’s Act, is criticizable. This is so because the legislative histories and contexts of
the Intestate Succession Act and the Children’s Act are quite different: the former lays down succession rules based on a strictly generational approach to blood relationship—an approach that can be
traced back to the old Schependomsrecht—whereas the latter sets
out contemporary principles regarding the care and protection of
children and, moreover, defines parental responsibilities and rights
vis-à-vis those children. The Court’s reliance in Wilsnach on the
meaning of “parent” in a statute that has little, if anything, in common with the Intestate Succession Act is thus historically and contextually highly suspect.91 It is therefore submitted that the parental
concept in the Intestate Succession Act must retain its limited meaning of single-generational biological connectedness or parenthood
through a valid adoption. Doing so, even in respect of the abhorrent
conduct of the deceased’s father and the laudable actions of the deceased’s grandmother in Wilsnach, need not contravene the Constitution and its underlying values as the Court in this case would have
one believe: Wilsnach’s outcome could have been achieved without
any judicial tampering with the meaning of “parent” for purposes of
the Intestate Succession Act. De Waal and Mills92 as well as Van
Vuren93 correctly point out that the same result could probably have
been achieved if the deceased’s grandmother had instituted a claim
against the deceased estate for the expenses she incurred in caring
90. Id. at paras. 83, 93.
91. See, e.g., De Waal & Mills, supra note 18, at 569: the co-authors regard
the Court in Wilsnach’s incorporation of the Children’s Act’s definition of “parent” into the Intestate Succession Act as “problematic.”
92. De Waal & Mills, supra note 18, at 570–571.
93. Louis van Vuren, From What Constitutes a Parent, to Soundness of Mind:
Three Fiduciary-Related Court Case Summaries by FISA, WITHOUT PREJUDICE
(Quarter 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/5PZK-2A7P.
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for the deceased, coupled with an application to have the deceased’s
father declared unworthy to inherit based on his total neglect of his
son. Such a course of action would have secured ample compensation for the deceased’s grandmother and would have bestowed an
intestate inheritance on the deceased’s mother to the exclusion of his
father. Unfortunately, the Court in Wilsnach was ostensibly persuaded by the particularly disconcerting facts of the case to follow a
different and rather dubious interpretative approach to resolving the
matter: Wilsnach is therefore a hard case that made bad law or, as
De Waal and Mills contend, a case that “raises more questions than
it provides answers.”94 In light of the private lawyer’s need for legal
certainty referred to earlier, this can never be a satisfactory outcome.
III. THE LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF TESTATION
Freedom of testation is a cornerstone of South Africa’s testate
succession laws.95 Many of Civil Law’s typical limitations on testamentary freedom, such as forced heirship and mandatory asset
claims, cannot be obtained in South Africa. One limitation on testamentary freedom that South Africa shares with its civilian counterparts, is that effect is not given to testamentary provisions that are
contra bonos mores or, in contemporary phraseology, that violate
public policy. South African courts have traditionally applied the
public policy limitation on freedom of testation with circumspection
and restraint. Some patently untenable testamentary provisions, for
example, those aimed at the destruction of existing marriages, have
consistently been adjudged as offending public policy.96 These provisions that are clearly in contravention of public policy aside, South
African courts have traditionally refrained from invoking public policy to intrude on testators’ dispositive choices, in particular their
choices in respect of instituting and excluding beneficiaries under
94. De Waal & Mills, supra note 18, at 571.
95. In re BOE Trust Ltd 2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA) at paras. 26–27 (S. Afr.).
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Swanevelder 1949 (1) SA 733 (O) (S. Afr.); Ex parte
Isaacs 1964 (4) SA 606 (GW) (S. Afr.); Oosthuizen v Bank Windhoek Ltd 1991
(1) SA 849 (Nm) (S. Afr.).
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testamentary gifts. In Campbell v Daly,97 the erstwhile Transvaal
Local Division of the Supreme Court stated its position as follows:
The mere fact that the dispositions in a will may appear to
be unreasonable, unfair, capricious, or otherwise unacceptable does not empower a Court to depart therefrom. The testator is at liberty to be as generous or restrictive in his bequests as he pleases.98
South African courts have, during the post-constitutional era,
used public policy to an ever-greater extent to limit testamentary
freedom, even in instances that were earlier regarded as beyond reproach pursuant to the legal position stated in Campbell. This has
principally occurred in respect of testators’ choices to include some
and to exclude others from benefitting under testamentary gifts. The
courts did so with firm reliance on constitutional rights and norms,
in particular those regarding equality and non-discrimination. In
Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd,99 it was said in this regard
that contemporary South African public policy is rooted in the Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines. When, therefore,
a court must adjudicate on a policy-based challenge to a restricted
testamentary gift, it must be guided by “the founding constitutional
values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and nonsexism.”100 Proceeding from this point of departure, South African
courts have used public policy progressively to undo what they
deemed the constitutionally-untenable consequences of restricted
testamentary gifts. A dual distinction can broadly be drawn in this
regard, namely between courts’ engagement with testamentary charitable trusts on the one hand, and their engagement with non-charitable (or private) testamentary bequests on the other hand.

97.
98
.
99.
100.

1988 (4) SA 714 (T).
Id. at 720H.
2006 (4) SA 205 (C).
Id. at para. 24.

2021-2022]

SOUTH AFRICA

387

A. Charitable Trusts
In Syfrets Trust, the erstwhile Cape Provincial Division of the
High Court ruled that a testator’s exclusion of non-White, female,
and Jewish students at a public university from benefitting under a
testamentary bursary trust fell afoul of constitutionally founded public policy. The Court held that limiting bursary eligibility to White
students only occasioned indirect discrimination on the grounds of
race and/or color; moreover, that the exclusion of female and Jewish
students from bursary eligibility constituted direct discrimination on
the grounds of gender and religion.101 The Court therefore ordered
that the restrictions in respect of bursary eligibility must be struck
from the testator’s will.102 The Supreme Court of Appeal followed
suit in Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of
KwaZulu-Natal103 when it dismissed an appeal against the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban’s order to strike a racial restriction
on eligibility under a testamentary bursary trust from the testator’s
will.104 In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal
remarked that “racially discriminatory testamentary dispositions
will not pass constitutional muster”105 and that “[t]he constitutional
imperative to remove racially restrictive clauses that conflict with
public policy from the conditions of an educational trust...must
surely take precedence over freedom of testation, particularly given
the fundamental values of our Constitution.”106 The Western Cape
High Court, Cape Town subsequently produced a similar outcome
in In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust107 when it ordered the excision of racial and gender eligibility restrictions from three separate
testamentary bursary trusts. The Court also ordered the variation of
these trusts’ provisions to make the bursaries available to students

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at para. 33.
Id. at paras. 47, 49.
2010 (6) SA 518 (SCA).
Id. at para. 50.
Id. at para. 38.
Id. at para. 42.
2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC).
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of all races and genders.108 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
observed that “the impugned conditions . . . constitute unfair discrimination on grounds of gender and race and are in conflict with s
9(4) of the Constitution109 and the public interest.”110
The decisions above can be supported insofar as they dealt with
testamentary charitable trusts. These trusts possess a distinct public
dimension by reason of their defining characteristic, namely that
they operate for the public benefit. In this light, a charitable trust can
rightly be regarded as a “public trust” that must comply with the
demands of public law norms.111 In Ex parte Henderson112 it was
said that “public benefit” in the context of a charitable trust does not
necessarily denote benefitting the public at large, but that it also encompasses the bestowal of benefits on sections of society. However,
in such a case, the particular section or group must be sufficiently
large and representative; moreover, the bequest to that section or
group must advance the public interest.113 The public benefit characteristic of a charitable trust thus generally engages the size of the
beneficiary class, the extent to which that class represents society at
large, and the advancement of the public interest. In the case of a
testamentary charitable bursary trust bequest to students, or a designated group of students, at a public school or university, the public
benefit characteristic usually demands that the beneficiary class
must constitute a sufficiently large and representative cross-section
of society; additionally, that the bequest to this class must serve
some public interest (for example, the educational advancement of
108. Id. at para. 23.
109. § 9 is the Constitution’s equality clause.
110. Heydenrych, supra note 107, at para. 20.
111. See, e.g., J Phillips, Case Comment: Anti-Discrimination, Freedom of
Property Disposition, and the Public Policy of Charitable Educational Trusts: A
Comment on Re Canada Trust Company and Ontario Human Rights Commission,
9 THE PHILANTHROPIST J., July 1 1990, at 25, https://perma.cc/Z3AV-FKNN
(Last accessed: 27 May 2022) ; JW Colliton, Race and Sex Discrimination in
Charitable Trusts, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 275, 293 (2003)
https://perma.cc/8JBR-K2LJ (Last accessed: 27 May 2022).
112. 1971 (4) SA 549 (D).
113. Id. at 554A.
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financially disadvantaged students).114 The judicial striking-out of
the ineligibility criteria in Syfrets Trust, Emma Smith and Heydenrych therefore broadened the relevant beneficiary classes to include
students at the respective universities or schools, regardless of these
students’ race or color, gender, or religion. In the result, the excision
of the ineligibility criteria in these cases ensured that the bursary
gifts complied fully with the public benefit characteristic of charitable trusts. As such, the striking-out of the ineligibility criteria in
these cases conformed to contemporary South African public policy
as informed by public law norms on equality and non-discrimination, thereby rendering the judicial variation of the wills at issue a
justifiable limitation on the respective testators’ freedom of testation.115
B. Private Bequests
In King v De Jager,116 the Constitutional Court ruled that the
exclusion of two co-testators’ female descendants as fideicommissary heirs under a testamentary fideicommissum over certain immovable property occasioned unfair gender-based discrimination.
The Court reasoned that, in the majority judgment in particular, that
unfairly discriminatory disinheritances in private bequests are ipso
jure in violation of public policy and thus unenforceable in terms of
the common law boni mores (or public policy) rule.117 The Court
also found that the gender-based discrimination wrought by the disinheritance in this case conflicts with the Constitution’s equality directive118 which, in conjunction with its violation of public policy,
rendered the impugned clause governing the fideicommissum unenforceable.119 The Court finally ruled that the offending clause also
fell afoul of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Harvey v Crawford 2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA) at para. 60 (S. Afr.).
Wilkinson v Crawford 2021 (4) SA 323 (CC) at para. 127 (S. Afr.).
2021 (4) SA 1 (CC).
Id. at para. 96.
Id. at para. 130.
Id. at para. 158.
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Discrimination Act120 and that it was unenforceable on this ground
as well.121
The King judgment is contentious, because it concerned a private bequest and not a charitable (and thus public) gift such as those
at issue in the cases discussed in the preceding part. One is reminded
of Lord Wilberforce’s famous statement in Blathwayt v Baron Cawley,122 namely that the choice of beneficiaries, if it is made in a testator’s limited and private sphere, is not tantamount to discrimination because it does not operate over a larger and more impersonal
(read: public) field.123 It is therefore difficult to conceive how the
co-testators’ female descendants in King, who had no legal entitlement to the specific testamentary gifts bestowed under the private
fideicommissum, nor indeed any right at all to inherit from the cotestators, could successfully claim that the testators’ private choice
to institute others and not them as fideicommissary heirs occasioned
unfair discrimination, even if the testators’ choice involved one or
more of the non-discrimination grounds listed in the Constitution’s
equality clause.124 This is not to say that public policy has no role
whatsoever to play in regard to private testamentary bequests. It is
submitted, however, that public policy’s role in this regard is to prohibit a testator from visiting substantially incontestable harm (to
borrow from Robins JA in Canada Trust Co v Ontario Human
Rights Commission125) on a beneficiary when making such a bequest. In King, the Constitutional Court advanced neither any cogent
reason why the female descendants’ disinheritance was substantially
and incontestably harmful to them specifically, nor any explanation
of exactly what manner of actual harm befell each of these descendants by reason of their disinheritance.
120. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000 (S. Afr.).
121. King, supra note 116, at para. 163.
122. [1975] 3 All ER 625 (HL).
123. Id. at 636.
124. See Harvey, supra note 114, at para. 64; Wilkinson, supra note 115, at
para. 131.
125. 69 DLR (4th) 321 at para. 36.
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It is therefore submitted that a private testamentary gift and the
institution and disinheritance of beneficiaries under such a gift in
particular must be adjudged primarily in regard to its private consequences which, if not substantially and incontestably harmful to
those excluded as heirs, should not be disturbed by a Court. The
Constitutional Court’s judgment in King is thus open to criticism
insofar as the Court bridged the public/private divide in the law of
gifts far too readily and, in doing so, intruded unduly on the testators’ freedom of testation.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
South African courts have, since the advent of the country’s current constitutional dispensation, reshaped its succession laws to conform to the founding constitutional values of human dignity, equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism,
and non-sexism. In the vast majority of cases, this reshaping is to be
welcomed, in particular when it occasioned an expansion of succession rights to parties to whom the law theretofore afforded no rights
to inherit either on intestacy or in terms of a will. South African
courts’ methodologies in this regard can serve as a guide to courts
and/or legislatures in other jurisdictions grappling with similar challenges. In a few cases, however, the courts handed down dubious
judgments based on questionable reasoning – ostensibly to achieve
outcomes they perceived as equitable and just but, nevertheless, outcomes that do not accord with the basic tenets of South Africa’s succession laws. These judgments created considerable legal uncertainty and will hopefully be revisited by the appropriate courts in the
future.
The constitutional reshaping of South Africa’s succession laws
brings the intersection of private law and public law generally, and
in the law of gifts and trusts specifically, to the fore. The manner in
and the extent to which courts ought to engage with this intersection
is a contentious and challenging issue on which individual judges
and academic commentators often disagree. As long as this
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intersection and the attendant constitutional reshaping of succession
laws rest on objective (or objectively determinable) criteria (such as
the existence of a religious union when broadening intestate succession rights or compliance with the requirements set for a particular
testamentary institution when altering the provisions of a will),
courts can generally venture sure-footedly into the constitutional reshaping of succession laws. However, when courts discard such criteria and, moreover, derogate from the existing succession rights of
others in attempts to arrive at just and equitable outcomes in succession cases, they find themselves on thin ice where they should proceed with the utmost caution and restraint in order not to open the
cracks (or chasms) of legal uncertainty. The Legislature is certainly
better placed to undertake law reform in these contentious cases.

